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Case No. 20070187-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant was convicted of criminal mischief, a class B misdemeanor; criminal 
trespass, a class B misdemeanor; and disorderly conduct, a class C misdemeanor. R. 39. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 
2004). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL & STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Was evidence that defendant violated a no-contact order, approached his 
ex-girlfriend's apartment and broke do\\> n her locked door sufficient to support his 
conviction for criminal mischief? 
Issue 2: Was evidence that defendant violated a no-contact order, approached his 
ex-girlfriend's apartment, and broke down her locked door sufficient to support his 
conviction for criminal trespass?1 
Standard of Review: "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the 
evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight 
of the evidence, or if we otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made." State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, [^5, 84 P.3d 1167 (internal quotations and 
citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-106(2) (West 2004) 
A person commits criminal mischief if the person: . . . (c) intentionally 
damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-206(2) (West 2004): 
A person is guilty of criminal trespass if.. . (a) he enters or remains 
unlawfully on property and:. . . (iii) is reckless as to whether his presence 
will cause fear for the safety of another. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 27, 2006, defendant was charged with one count of being a 
restricted person in possession of a dangerous weapon, one count of criminal mischief, 
one count of trespass, and one count of disorderly conduct. R. 1-2. Following a bench 
trial, defendant was convicted of one count of criminal mischief, one count of trespass, 
and one count of disorderly conduct. R. 39-41. Defendant timely appealed. R. 55. 
1
 Though defendant was also convicted of disorderly conduct, he has not 
challenged that conviction on appeal. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
After Tamela Hudyma moved out of defendant's home in February 20065 a judge 
issued a no-contact order forbidding defendant from having any contact with Hudyma or 
her daughter. R. 67: 6, 16-19. The landlord at Hudyma's apartment also stated that 
defendant was not allowed on the property. R. 67: 27. 
In spite of this, defendant approached Hudyma's apartment on November 15, 2006 
and rang the doorbell. R. 67: 6. When Hudyma did not open the door, defendant broke 
the door down and followed Hudyma as she retreated up the stairs. R. 67: 8, 30, 43. 
When police arrived, they found defendant and Hudyma arguing in Hudyma's upstairs 
bathroom. R. 67: 8, 49. As officers attempted to restrain defendant, he began yelling 
profanities at them. R. 67: 42. Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with 
four misdemeanors. R. 1-3. 
Defendant's theory at trial was that his actions were justified because he was 
living with Hudyma at the time of the incident. Hudyma specifically rejected this claim: 
Q: Mr. Larsen had some possessory interest in this place; is that correct, in your 
home? 
A: Had some what? 
Q: He had some interest in your home; is that right? 
A: Um, meaning like some - -
"[I]t is the province of the trier of fact[, in this case the trial court,] to determine 
which testimony and facts to believe and what inferences to draw from those facts.'" 
State v. Cravens, 2000 UT App 344, f 18, 15 P.3d 635 (citation omitted). On appeal 
from a bench trial, this Court accordingly views the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the trial court's verdict. State v. Nichols, 2003 UT App 287, \ 1 n.l, 76 P.3d 1173. 
3 
Q: Did he live there? 
A: In my home? 
Q: Yes. 
A: No. 
R. 67: 19. 
Hudyma also specifically rejected defendant's assertion that he had any ownership 
interest in her door: 
Q: And that wasn't George's door; correct? It was your door. 
A: It was my door. 
R. 67: 15. 
Hudyma and the responding officers also rejected defendant's claim that he had 
not damaged the door when he broke into Hudyma's apartment. Hudyma explained that 
defendant had previously kicked this same door in before, but that she had had the door 
repaired prior to November 15, 2006. R. 67: 43-44. Hudyma said that she heard the 
"wood crack" as defendant broke through, and officers who responded to the scene saw 
"fresh wood laying . . . on the carpet of the apartment" by the door. R. 67: 25, 48, 51. 
One of the officers also observed that "the dead bolt had been busted out." R. 67: 49. 
Thus, while there may have been some residual damage to the door from the prior 
incident, defendant did "further damage" to the door when he broke through on 
November 15, 2006. R. 67: 8, 21, 29, 48-51. 
4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of criminal 
mischief. The evidence clearly showed that defendant inflicted damage to the door when 
he broke through, however, and the evidence also specifically rebutted defendant's claim 
that he had a possessory interest in Hudyma's apartment at the time of this incident. 
Defendant also claims that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of criminal 
trespass. The evidence clearly showed that defendant entered Hudyma's property 
unlawfully, however, thereby supporting the trial court's verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
L THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT 
DEFENDANT OF CRIMINAL MISCHIEF 
Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of criminal 
mischief. When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, this Court 
"sustain[s] the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the 
evidence," or "otherwise reach[es] a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made." State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, % 5, 84 P.3d 1167 (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). Furthermore, "it is the province of the trier of fact[, in this case the trial court,] 
to determine which testimony and facts to believe and what inferences to draw from 
those facts." State v. Cravens, 2000 UT App 344,115, 15 P.3d 635. This Court 
therefore "determine[s] only whether sufficient competent evidence was admitted to 
satisfy each element of the charge." State v. Horde, 2002 UT 4, \ 44, 57 P.3d 977. 
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"A person commits criminal mischief if the person: . . . ( c ) intentionally damages, 
defaces, or destroys the property of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106(2) (West 
2004). In this case, Hudyma specifically testified that defendant damaged her door when 
he broke it open, thereby satisfying the elements of the charge. R. 67: 8-9, 25. 
In response, defendant first claims that the door was already damaged when he 
knocked it down. Aplt. Br. 23. Though it is true that defendant had already damaged the 
door in a prior incident, R. 67: 43, the evidence at trial showed that he damaged it again 
on November 15, 2006. Specifically, Hudyma heard the "wood crack" as defendant 
broke through the door, and officers who responded to the scene saw "fresh" damage to 
the door, including "fresh wood laying . . . on the carpet of the apartment" by the door. 
R. 67: 25, 48, 51. In addition, one of the officers observed that "the dead bolt had been 
busted out" when defendant broke through. R. 67: 9, 49. When asked about the damage 
during trial, Hudyma specifically stated that defendant did "further damage" to the door 
when he broke through on November 15, 2006. R. 67: 8; see also R. 67: 21, 29, 48-51. 
Given this unrebutted testimony, the trial court's conclusion that defendant damaged the 
door was not against the clear weight of the evidence. 
Defendant next claims that there was no evidence that he "destroyed] the property 
of another," because he had a "possessory interest in the property as a cohabitant of 
Hudyma." Aplt. Br. 25. This claim is incorrect. At trial, Hudyma specifically testified 
that the door was hers, not defendant's. R. 67: 15. The trial court had the prerogative to 
believe Hudyma's testimony on this point, Cravens, 2000 UT App 344, f^ 15, and 
defendant's claim can be rejected on this basis alone. 
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Defendant's claim that he was Hudyma's cohabitant is similarly unavailing. 
Assuming arguendo that defendant actually was Hudyma's cohabitant, defendant has not 
provided any support for his claim that a cohabitant automatically gains an ownership 
interest over the other cohabitant's real and personal property. This unsupported, 
sweeping assertion is both inadequately briefed and frivolous on its face. 
In any event, defendant was not Hudyma's cohabitant at the time of this incident. 
In order to be a cohabitant, two persons must share a common residency. Haddow v. 
Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 672 (Utah 1985). Hudyma specifically stated, however, that she 
did not live with defendant when he broke her door down. R. 67: 19. In fact, defendant 
was subject to a no-contact order, thereby officially preventing him from residing with 
Hudyma. R. 67: 6, 16-19. Defendant did not testify at trial, nor did he submit any 
evidence of any kind of joint tenancy arrangement with respect to the apartment. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, the fact that he had left some personal items at 
Hudyma's apartment did not establish either residency or ownership over Hudyma's 
door. Aplt. Br. 24. In Haddow, an ex-husband claimed that his ex-wife was sharing a 
common residence with her new boyfriend. 707 P.2d at 673. Although the boyfriend had 
left clothes, toiletries, and a photo album at the ex-wife's home, the supreme court held 
that this was not enough to establish common residency: "[W]e fail to see any 
determinative significance in the presence of any one or all of these portable items in the 
appellant's residence." Id. Defendant in this case left his pet fish and some movies at 
Hudyma's apartment, and he also sometimes left clothes there if Hudyma was doing 
laundry. R. 67: 20. While this may have evidenced some sort of continuing personal 
7 
relationship, it simply did not establish common residency or shared ownership of 
Hudyma's door. Thus, even if it did legally matter, defendant simply was not Hudyma's 
cohabitant at the time of this incident. 
Finally, defendant claims that he did not have the requisite intent to commit 
criminal mischief because Hudyma was never actually afraid that she would be 
physically harmed. Aplt. Br. 22-23, 25-26. Hudyma's fear (or lack thereof) was 
irrelevant to the charge of criminal mischief. Though Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-
106(2)(b) does allow a charge of criminal mischief if the defendant "recklessly endangers 
human life," the State did not charge defendant with violating § 76-6-106(2)(b). Rather, 
the State charged defendant with violating § 76-6-106(2)(c) by "intentionally 
damage[ing], defac[ing], or destroy[ing] the property of another." R. 2. Hudyma's state 
of mind was therefore irrelevant to this charge. 
In any event, the evidence did support the court's conclusion that defendant had 
the intent to damage Hudyma's door under Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-102(2)(c). 
"Knowledge or intent is a state of mind generally to be inferred from the person's 
conduct viewed in light of all the accompanying circumstances." State v. Kihlstrom, 
1999 UT App 289, ^ 10, 988 P.2d 949. "A person's state of mind is not always 
susceptible of proof by direct and positive evidence, and, if not, may ordinarily be 
inferred from acts, conduct, statements or circumstances." State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211, 
1213 (Utah 1980); see also State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991) ("It is well 
established that intent can be proven by circumstantial evidence."). 
Here, even there was a no-contact order in place ordering defendant to stay away 
8 
from Hudyma, defendant nevertheless approached Hudyma's apartment, broke her door 
down, and followed Hudyma as she retreated up the stairs. R. 67: 8, 30, 43. Under these 
circumstances, the trial court did not act against the clear weight of the evidence when it 
concluded that defendant had the intent to damage Hudyma's door. 
n. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT 
DEFENDANT OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS 
Under Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-206(2) (West 2004), "[a] person is guilty of 
criminal trespass if.. . (a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and:. . . (iii) is 
reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety of another." 
Contrary to defendant's claim, the trial court did not act against the clear weight of 
the evidence when it concluded that defendant entered Hudyma's apartment unlawfully. 
As discussed above, the evidence showed that defendant: (1) violated a no-contact order 
by entering Hudyma's apartment, R. 67: 6, 16-18; (2) violated an express order of no 
entry by the building's landlord, R. 67: 27; and (3) unlawfully damaged Hudyma's door 
as he entered in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-106. 
In response, defendant again claims that he had an unqualified right to enter the 
apartment because he had some sort of possessory interest in it. As discussed above, 
however, while the evidence did show that defendant had left a few personal items at the 
apartment, the evidence also showed that defendant was not residing there, and there was 
no evidence of any official leasehold or shared residency agreement. Thus, defendant did 
not have a right of entry, let alone a possessory interest in the apartment, and he therefore 
acted unlawfully by breaking Hudyma's door down in an effort to gain access. 
9 
With respect to the intent element, the State alleged below that defendant had 
"reckless[ly] . . . caused fear for the safety of another." R. 2. On appeal, while defendant 
discusses Hudyma's fear (or lack thereof) with respect to the criminal mischief charge, he 
does not expressly renew the argument with respect to criminal trespass. Aplt. Br. 27-29. 
Even if defendant has somehow renewed the argument by implication, it should 
still be rejected. The State was not required to prove that Hudyma was actually afraid in 
order to sustain the charge of criminal trespass. Rather, the State simply needed to show 
that by entering unlawfully, defendant was "reckless as to whether his presence will 
cause fear for the safety of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2)(a)(iii). A person 
acts recklessly when he or she "consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) (West 2004). In this case, after Hudyma did not 
answer the door when defendant rang her doorbell, defendant physically broke her door 
open, "crack[ing]" the door and "bust[ing] out" the dead bolt in the process. R. 67: 49. 
Given the no-contact order that was already in place, these violent and aggressive actions 
created a substantial and unjustifiable risk that Hudyma would fear for her safety when 
defendant finally broke through. Thus, the trial court did not act against the clear weight 




For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the convictions below. 
Respectfully submitted October •ZT, 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
/j/%m 0. 1. 
RYAM^). TENNEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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